Automation is viewed as a prime suspect for the decades of stagnation felt by American workers. The reaction to this problem, by both lay people and the economics literature, follows a Pigouvian intuition: robots harm workers, so they should be taxed. This paper argues that this Pigouvian intuition is misguided, or at least oversimplified. As shown by the recent literature modeling automation within the task framework, capital only exerts a negative pecuniary externality on labor at the extensive margin of automation. At the intensive margin, more capital producing a task that has already been automated raises wages for everyone via capital deepening. To formalize this point, I present a model with heterogeneous agents where the Planner can tax income from capital and labor as well as target the extensive margin of automation by stipulating how much more expensive labor must be than capital before automation can occur. I show, via an envelope argument, that capital taxation should ignore automation when the extensive margin tool is set optimally. In a quantitative application to the US economy, I find that labor should be 3.4% more expensive than capital before automation can occur.